A major Google Cloud outage on October 20 disrupted banking services across the UK, raising fresh concerns around the financial sector’s dependence on third-party technology providers. The disruption affected Revolut, Lloyds and HSBC and has prompted scrutiny from UK and EU regulators, putting recently introduced operational-resilience rules to the test.
According to Google’s preliminary incident report, the disruption lasted approximately six hours and ten minutes. It was triggered by an electrical power failure at a data center serving Google’s London cloud region. The incident was compounded further by malfunctioning automated controls that prevented backup generators from taking over. While the initial failure impacted only one availability zone, the resulting surge in traffic and processing demand in nearby availability zones also disrupted services across a much wider area.
The consequences extended far beyond routine website outages. For example, Revolut customers experienced issues accessing their accounts, making card payments and withdrawing cash, while Lloyds and HSBC reported problems with access to their digital banking services. While Revolut later confirmed that customer funds and data remained secure, the incident did demonstrate how infrastructure failures can simultaneously interrupt a wide range of critical financial services.
A major test for new resilience regulations
The timing is particularly significant in light of the UK government’s July designation of Google Cloud, along with three other major technology companies, as Critical Third Parties (CTPs). This designation brings their critical services to the financial sector under direct oversight of the Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The move was a response to the systemic risks that come with having a highly concentrated pool of critical services provided by a handful of technology companies.
The outage has already prompted regulatory scrutiny, particularly in light of operational-resilience requirements concerning essential financial services. The UK’s Treasury Committee was quick to request information about the authorities’ response and any potential harm to customers. Meanwhile, the European Banking Authority contacted Google to assess any implications the incident might have had on financial institutions in the EU. Moreover, Google is subject to direct EU oversight under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which became applicable in January 2025.
However, under these new frameworks, regulated firms—such as financial services providers—remain accountable for maintaining resilience and managing operational risks. They do not transfer responsibility for service continuity to technology suppliers themselves. Comparable expectations exist elsewhere, including the US, where federal banking regulators have issued guidance on managing risks associated with third-party vendor relationships.
A new test for fintechs and financial services providers
For fintechs and financial services companies alike, this latest incident again demonstrates the importance of knowing exactly where their operational dependencies lie. Because a single cloud failure can affect everything from payment processing to authentication systems and other interconnected services, organizations must carefully map out their dependencies, identify potential single points of failure and assess whether their existing resilience arrangements are able to withstand regional infrastructure disruptions. They should also test failover scenarios in which infrastructure in unaffected zones comes under pressure.