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10 Reasons Ransomware Keeps Paying Off for Criminals

Written by Maria-Diandra Opre | Nov 17, 2026, 1:26:55 PM

Nearly 2,900 ransomware incidents were claimed in three months, up almost 50% from the same period last year, according to NordLayer Intelligence's Q3 2026 figures. That's a market that has clearly survived the disruption of a number of the major operators. The figure is derived from criminal leak sites rather than a full tally of attacks. Again, with that caveat, it's a clear indication of the weakness in the ransomware response model: you can disrupt one gang, and you've still got the infrastructure in place for the rest of them to operate. The trade in stolen access, the exposed systems available to the next wave of operators. (NordLayer Intelligence, 2026). Criminals can buy in, exploit the operational pressure, and threaten exposure long after the systems have recovered. The following 10 factors are the key ones in terms of their impact on exposure and recovery.

10. Criminal expertise survives the disappearance of a brand

NordLayer monitoring recorded 383 and 363 incidents for The Gentlemen and Qilin respectively, roughly 26% of the quarterly total. Those two operations were far from the only ones in the market (NordLayer Intelligence, 2026). After a takedown, experienced operators will often find new operators. Europol has seen ransomware groups split and rebrand following a takedown. It's much harder to maintain when you're constantly getting replacement operators who can exploit the same weaknesses the original operators did (Europol, 2024).

9. Breaking in and demanding payment have become separate jobs

Extortion campaigns can simply start with a purchase. Access brokers will sell you a foothold in a compromised system, letting another criminal take over without doing the initial breach. That's the scenario Europol describes in its 2025 assessment (Europol, 2025) of the trade in access and stolen information. Someone else could have compromised the account used to steal the files at an earlier stage. It's absolutely vital to establish how access was gained and whether any other footholds exist before you can properly remove the intrusion (it's not enough simply to stop the latest phase of the attack).

8. Smaller companies can be attractive, consequential targets

A specialist manufacturer might have fewer than 200 people in the business and yet have some very valuable designs, customer data and a very tight production schedule. Its commercial exposure can be very high in relation to the resources available to protect it. In the Verizon 2025 data set, ransomware was present in 88% of the breaches that affected the smaller organizations, versus 39% of the breaches that affected the larger ones. These are recorded breach figures rather than attack probabilities. They do however go some way to undermining the notion that the criminals are exclusively after the big players (Verizon, 2025).

7. Necessary supplier relationships create difficult access decisions

Remote maintenance and outsourced support can give outside organizations access to the critical systems. The customer benefits from that expertise and still has the difficult responsibility of working out how much access to grant and how closely to monitor it. Third parties were involved in 30% of the breaches in Verizon's 2025 report (twice the figure from the prior year). That figure goes beyond ransomware, but it points to the need for greater scrutiny of supplier permissions. A contract is of very little operational value if you don't know who can suspend a connection in the event of compromise (Verizon 2025).

6. Downtime gives attackers leverage beyond the stolen files

Mean recovery cost in Sophos's 2025 ransomware survey was $1.53m (excluding ransom payments). There was a huge variation in recovery times with 53% of organisations recovering within a week and 18% taking over a month (Sophos, 2025). A month can contain a number of missed deliveries, delayed invoices and customers going elsewhere. That's why the pressure to make a ransomware decision rapidly extends well beyond the security team. Keeping essential work running during an outage gives management more breathing room to respond without every passing hour worsening the commercial position.

5. Successful data recovery can conceal an expensive ordeal

A 97% recovery rate on the surface seems pretty good. However, amongst the Sophos respondents whose data was encrypted, 49% actually paid a ransom and got their data back. Recovery rate in itself tells you very little about independence, speed, or cost (Sophos 2025). The more rigorous evaluation is a business transaction. Can staff retrieve an order, process payment, and arrange dispatch using the restored systems? That exercise will reveal the dependencies that a backup report might well miss (identity services, application configs, integrations, etc., which will all have to work before normal business can resume).

4. Restoring operations leaves stolen information in criminal hands

Imagine getting back all the affected servers and then getting samples of the confidential negotiations the attacker intends to leak. The systems are back up, the extortion is ongoing. NordLayer report that some operators will go completely unencrypted and just rely on the threat of disclosure (NordLayer Intelligence, 2026).

This fundamentally alters the value of the day-to-day information management decisions. Decades of readily available personnel and commercial records can provide additional leverage. Limiting access and removing information that no longer needs to be there reduces what an attacker can gather, even with strong recovery arrangements.

3. Business credentials travel beyond managed equipment

An employer can quite easily secure their laptops whilst the same corporate accounts remain accessible from other machines. The overlap between personal and business use in this scenario makes for a rather complicated situation within an otherwise well-run security program. Of the compromised systems in Verizon's infostealer analysis with corporate logins, 46% were unmanaged devices with both personal and business credentials. That's with respect to the logs that were examined, so it's a bit of a caveat on that finding, but it does underline the need to take into account the state of the device as well as the user when making access decisions (Verizon, 2025).

2. Known weaknesses remain exposed while organizations arrange fixes

32 days = median time to remediate the edge device vulnerabilities looked at in Verizon's 2025 report. Around 54% were fully remediated during the period of the report (Verizon, 2025). There may be legitimate issues around testing, compatibility and service disruption behind a delay. An urgent exposure however will require a different course of action than normal maintenance. Clear authority to either restrict access or to apply temporary mitigations will be required to ensure a known vulnerability isn't left accessible whilst the team work through an acceptable window.

1. Stolen identities inherit permissions granted long before the attack

Credential abuse was the number one vector for initial access in Verizon's relevant breach dataset at 22% (slightly ahead of vulnerability exploitation at 20%). Identity is, of course, the big one here, as it's such an important asset post-initial access (Verizon, 2025). The impact will be entirely dependent on what the account is capable of doing: reading departmental files, exporting customer records, changing security settings or managing backups. That access may have been granted over many years. You want to look at those permissions prior to an incident as that will limit the damage that can be done by a stolen identity. If you don't look at them then the attacker will be able to exploit the access that the business has already approved.